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VICTOR BRAJER*, AL CHURCH, RONALD CUMMINGS
and PHILLIP FARAH**

The Strengths and Weaknesses of
Water Markets as They Affect
Water Scarcity and Sovereignty
Interests in the West
ABSTRACT
Primarilyas a result of a landmark decision of the Supreme Court
in the Sporhase case, the issue of water scarcity has reemerged over
the lastfew years as a topic of practicaland intellectualfocus. This
paper addresses the desirabilityof using the free market as a means
for allocating scarce water resources. First, the potential strengths
and weaknesses claimedfor markets as a meansfor allocating scarce
commodities are discussed. Next, the extent to which the marketfor
water rights in New Mexico is a competitive, well-functioning one
is examined. Concluding that this market is probablyfarfrom being
"perfect," or well-functioning, the implications of allocating water
within an imperfect market are then considered. Finally,some special

problems are outlined that may arisefor governments if major reliance is to be placed on markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
While water scarcity has presented problems in Western States since
well before the settlement of this area by the United States,' it has reemerged over the last few years as a topic of practical and intellectual
focus, primarily as a result of a landmark decision of the Supreme Court
in the Sporhase case. 2 As is well-known today, the Court in Sporhase
held that water (in this case, groundwater) was an article "in commerce"
and was therefore subject to the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
Of the many potential effects of this decision, two are of primary importance for the purposes of this paper. First, regional markets are essentially established for unappropriated (and, for that matter, appropriated)
water supplies, the bounds of which are simply set by acquisition and
*California State University, Fullerton
**University of New Mexico
I, A. MASS & R. ANDERSON, AND THE DESERT SHALL REJOICE: CONFLICT, GROWTH AND JUSTICE
IN ARID ENVIRONMENTS (1978).
2. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
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transportation costs. 3 Second, western states, who have traditionally dealt
with conflicts between scarce water supplies and growing water needs
via water-use planning and regulation, now find the water management
problem out of control-certainly, out of their control. 4

There has been mixed reaction to this dramatic change in the decisionmaking environment for the control and allocation of water resources
in the West. 5 Some see the logic underlying the Sporhase decision as
faulty per se,6 and point to the adverse, if not disastrous, effects of putting

water resources in a state out of the control of the state and into the
marketplace. 7 These predicted negative effects include the distortion of

longstanding water institutions," a failure to adequately provide for the
water needs of future generations,' and a loss of "social" values arising

from common uses of water resources (such as instream flows)." Others
welcome the change, viewing the free market as offering a means for
imposing discipline and flexibility on water rights institutions in the West.
Advocates of this position argue that, as conditions relevant for the pro-

ductivity of water change through time, the market provides a mechanism
for shifting water use from low to high valued uses, with water use
remaining efficient through time."
Legal scholars, debating points of law raised in the Sporhase case and
later related cases,' 2 may be puzzled at what might seem to be the in3.

See N.M. WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH INST. & UNIV. OF N.M. SCHOOL OF LAW, STATE AP-

PROPRIATION OF UNAPPROPRIATED GROUNDWATER: A STRATEGY FOR INSURING NEW MEXICO A WATER

FUTURE (1986) [hereinafter WRR].
4. See id.; DuMars, New Mexico Water Law: An Overview and Discussion of Current Issues. 22
NAT. RES. J. 1045 (1982).
5. See the collection of papers which focus on this debate in 25 NAT. RES. J. 863-1024 (1985).
6. Utton, The El Paso Case: Reconciling Sporhase and Vermejo, 23 NAT. RES. J. ix (1983).
7. See WRR, supra note 3; K. Burke, R. Cummings & J. Mays, Interstate Allocation and
Management of Nontributary Groundwater (1984) (discussion paper prepared for Western Governors
Ass'n, available from Western Governors Policy Office, Denver, Colorado); DuMars, The State as
a Participant in Water Markets: Appropriate Rolesfor Congress and the Courts, 21 WATER RESOURCES
RES, 1771 (1985); Utton, Alternatives and Uncertainties in Interstate Groundwater Law, 21 WATER
RESOURCES RES. 1767 (1985); Nunn, The Political Econormy of Institutional Change: A Distribution
Criterion for Acceptance of Groundwater Rules, 25 NAT REs. J. 867 (1985); Utton. In Search of
an Integrating Principle for Interstate Water Law: Regulation versus the Market Place. 25 NAT.
RES, J. 985 (1985) 1hereinafter Utton, In Search of an Integrating Principle].
8. Brown, McDonald, Tysseling & DuMars, Water Reallocation, Market Proficiency and Conflicting Social Values, in WATER AND AGRICULTURE IN TIlE WESTERN U.S.: CONSERVATION, RE-

ALLOCATION, AND MARKETS 191 (G. Weatherford, ed, 1982) Ihereinafter Water Reallocation].
9. DuMars, supra note 7.
10. See Nunn, supra note 7.
II. For a collection of papers that are centered on this particular point of view, see WATER RIGHTS:
SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (T. Anderson, ed. 1983). A

much less elegant, and more advocative, exposition of this view is seen in Anderson. The Market
Alternative for Hawaiian Water, 25 NAT. RES, J. 893 (1985).
12. Eg., City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 700 (D.N.M. 1984). Some flavor for
this debate is seen in Utton, In Search of an Integrating Principle. supra note 7.
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tellectual disarray among economists over the desirability of markets as
a means for allocating scarce water resources. This is particularly so,
given the lawyers' penchant to occasionally view economics as being
based on a relatively value-free, "objective" set of premises. 3 After all,
one might ask, Aren't "markets" what economics is all about? This is
the issue which is addressed in this paper, an issue which involves the
following inextricably related questions:
a. If an economic or market solution is to be endorsed, what are the
strengths claimed for markets as a means for allocating scarce commodities and what are their potential weaknesses?
b. What are the requisites or conditions required for a "well-functioning" market? Do we now have any well-functioning markets for
water in the West? If conditions for a "perfect" market described do
not exist, what would be required to establish such conditions?
c. If the above-described conditions for a perfect market cannot
reasonably be established, what are the implications of allocating
water within an "imperfect" market?
d. Finally, what are the "special" advantages and problems for state
and federal governments that may arise should major reliance be
placed on markets as a means for allocating water resources?
The importance of these questions to the non-economist is the primary
motivation for this paper. Questions (a) through (d) describe the essence
of the discussions which will be given in sections II through V below.
The paper closes with section VI wherein some concluding remarks are
offered.
11. COMPETITIVE MARKETS AND THE "EFFICIENT"
USE OF RESOURCES
A competitive market is a market in which the forces of demand and
supply determine prices (a somewhat more rigorous treatment of this
concept is used below in section 111). Thus, for any scarce resources or
commodities, individuals who want access to the resources must bid for
them. Prices for the resources will be bid up until there is a match between
the amount of resources that people want to buy (at the bid price) and
the amount of resources that people will sell (at the bid price). If, at
current prices, there are more resources than there are individuals who
will buy them, the price would fall, of course. If there are more individuals
13. In this regard, see Bumess, Cummings, Gorman & Lansford, Practicably IrrigableAcreage
and Economic Feasibility: The Role of Time, Ethics, and Discounting, 23 NAT. REs. J. 289, 29091(1983).
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who want to buy the resources than there are resources, the price would
be bid up still further.
The process described above results in what economists refer to as an
"efficient" allocation of the resources. It is important that one understand
our use of the term "efficient." We assume that the price paid for the
resource reflects the minimum value of the resource to the person who
pays that price. We also assume that this price reflects the social value
of the resource. After all, if the value of the resource to a person was
less than the bid price, why would the person pay the price? Thus, for
those who are not buying the resource, the value of the resource to them
is taken to be less than the going price. Conversely, the price, to the
people who are buying the resource, is generally less than the value of
the resource to them. Simply put, if you are buying the resource at going
prices and I am not, we presume that the resource is being put to a higher
valued use by you (you are paying for it) than it would be put to if I
were using it (I am not paying for it-presumably, because its value in
use by me is less than the going price). We then say that the allocation
of resources is efficient-"efficient" in the sense that the resources are
being used in their highest-valued uses. Efficient resource allocation is
the major strength claimed for the market system.
A moment's reflection is probably enough to suggest to the reader
several sources of discomfort that one might have with the economist's
"efficient" resource allocation. First, market allocations of resources would
seem to presume that we are indifferent to the effects of the distribution
of income. Thus, in our example given above, suppose that the commodity
in question was milk. You are buying the milk at $5.00 per gallon while
I am not. The allocation of milk is "efficient" when I assume that, since
you buy the milk and I do not, that the milk's use by you is highervalued than my use of the milk. However, suppose that I am very poor,
while you are very rich. The value of the $5.00 that you spend for milk
may be quite small-what's $5.00 to a millionaire like you? To me,
however, $5.00 represents a large proportion of my income-relatively
speaking, $5.00 to me may be like $5,000 to you. Under these circumstances, can you then conclude that the fact that you are buying the milk
at $5.00 implies that your use of the milk is a higher-valued use than my
use of the milk? Obviously, you cannot. Thus, a major potential weakness
(well-known to economists) of the market solution is that it ignores the
implications of the existing distribution of income. One assumes that all
dollar "votes" have equal weight. In terms of reflecting use value, a
dollar spent by the poor man has the same weight as a dollar spent by
the rich man.
Resource allocations based on market-determined values may be sub-
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ject to a second, related criticism. Essentially, as implied above, market
values result from individuals "voting" in the marketplace-their ballots
are dollars. If there are more votes cast for the production of Cadillacs
than for the production of milk, more Cadillacs and less milk will be
produced. As noted above, such could result from circumstances wherein
a very few, very rich people want Cadillacs and very many, but very
poor people want milk, and the distribution of income is of no consequence in the market. The market reflects not needs, but effective wants
(wants with dollars behind them).
Consider next the potential effects on future generations of today's
resource allocation decisions. Suppose that you wish to buy resources
from me in the market. You and others compete for resources held by
me and others. By your offering of dollar votes, you will determine the
allocation of resources held by you and by me. Think now of my progeny
and suppose that they have an interest in an amount of resources held by
me. If I sell my resource endowment to you and others, my heirs are
then denied access to the resource. One may suppose that my actionsthe price that I require for the resource-reflects my best efforts to protect
their interests. Perhaps I'll not spend all of the money that I acquire from
the sale of my resource endowment, thereby bequeathing to them a bank
account, with accrued interest, in place of a bequeathal of resources. At
issue, however, is the fact that only today's generation can vote in today's
market which fixes the price of the resource. Future generations are denied
a "vote" in actions which might have fundamental impacts on their wellbeing. Concern with the market's failure to reflect the wishes (votes) of
future generations is more popularly seen in the non-economist's concern
with the responsibility of the State (rather than the market) to protect the
interests of future generations.' 4
Further, resource allocations based on the market and market prices
may be criticized on grounds that market prices may fail to reflect many
beneficial or costly effects of a given allocation of resources. Technically,
we say that the market does not reflect "external" (external to the market)
effects, sometimes simply called "externalities." Examples of externalities include: downstream saline pollution of river waters which can result
from upstream irrigation; "well interference"-falling water tables, and
therefore higher pumping costs (or less efficient pumping) at my well as
a result of pumping at your well; and shoreline beautification efforts by
one individual or unit. 5 Thus, all else equal, part of the costs of irrigation
14. See WRR, supra note 3.
15. For a discussion of "internalizing" such external costs, see W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, THE
THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1975).
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may be borne by those other than the irrigators, because downstream
users must pay the costs associated with having more saline water, even
though the upstream irrigator caused the increased salt load. If the irrigator
sells his water, the market price received by him will not reflect this cost
borne by downstream water users. Market values for water pumped by
my neighbor will generally not reflect effects on my well from well
interference. Similarly, there are typically no market values that will
capture the value to me of my enjoyment of your efforts to beautify the
shoreline (efforts for which you alone pay the costs). Market values will
not capture these external benefits and costs.
Finally, and related a bit to the notion of externalities, a market presupposes that property rights to any and all commodities to be traded are
well defined. Markets do not perform well in valuing goods or services
which are enjoyed, or which are costly, to groups of individuals in common. Examples of common property, or "fugitive" resources (or, with
a bit more elaboration, "public" goods 6 ), include groundwater, environmental quality (clean air, clean water), and parks-recreation facilities.
In the case of a public good, the good's market price should theoretically
reflect the collective willingness to pay of everyone who might wish to
consume the good. Since no one can be effectively excluded from consuming the good (it is, after all, publicly available), though, people might
have an incentive to underreport their desire for the good. They can
thereby avoid having to pay for it, and still enjoy consuming it anyway.
Such people are called "free riders," and if enough of them exist, the
market essentially breaks down in terms of yielding efficient resource
allocations.
To summarize, a well-functioning market can result in resources being
allocated in an "efficient" manner, where "efficient" refers to an allocation of resources such that resources are in their highest valued uses.
Problems can arise when market values, as opposed to other types of
"values," such as social and/or group values, 7 are used as a basis for
resource allocation. Market values cannot reflect differences in incomes
across participants in the market-the dollar vote of the poor man has
the same weight as the dollar vote of the millionaire. Still another distributive issue may arise when allocations are based on market prices:
preferences of future generations are without weight in the formation of
a market price. Externalities, like benefits and costs which do not involve
market transactions per se, are not reflected in market prices. Finally,
16, See R. CUMMINGS, D. BROOKSHIRE & W. ScHuLZE, VALUING PUBLIC GOODS (1986).
17. For a discussion of the community value of water. see F. BROWN & H. INGRAM, WATER AND
POVERTY IN TIlE SOUTHWEST (1986). See also Brajer & Martin, Water Rights Markets: Social and

Legal Considerations, AM. J. ECON. & Soc. (forthcoming); Water Reallocation, supra note 8.
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market prices (if they exist) may be poor indicators of value for commodities (such as public goods) for which property rights are not concisely
defined.
III. CONDITIONS FOR A "PERFECT" MARKET
Setting aside for the moment questions related to the desirability of
resource allocations based on markets, at this juncture we inquire as to
how well presently-established markets for water rights in the West approximate a "perfect," or (at the very least) a "well-functioning" market.
To this end, we begin by inquiring as to the basic requirements for a
perfect market. We then briefly inquire as to the extent that these conditions are probably satisfied, using conditions in the State of New Mexico
as an example. Finally, we speculate as to the likelihood that conditions
for a perfect, or well-functioning, market might be established in western
states.
There are four basic requirements for a well-functioning market. These
requirements are as follows:
1. Goods/Services Exchanged in the Market Must Be Those for
Which Property Rights are Well-Defined
In economics, the term property right refers to a bundle of entitlements
defining the owner's rights, privileges, and limitations for use of a resource. The structure of property rights that can produce efficient allocations in a well-functioning market economy is generally considered as
having four main characteristics. 8
a. Ownership:Ownership is simply a legal device that assigns the right
to use of a resource, subject to various possible restrictions, and is obviously necessary for a market transaction to take place. No one in his
or her right mind would pay for, say, a water right without some assurance
that he or she could then use that right.
b. Specification of rights: To facilitate the smooth functioning of a
market, it is insufficient merely to declare that exclusive ownership exists.
Property rights also must be completely specified; otherwise, individuals
independently exercising their various ownership rights would have no
means for resolving potential conflicts. In New Mexico, for example, the
doctrine of prior appropriation establishes the superiority of various claims
on water rights.
c. Transferability:All property rights should be transferable. A person
18. Two excellent discussions of property rights can be found in ch. 7 of A. RANDALL, RESOURCE
ECONOMICS (1981), and in ch. 3 of T. TIEvmFiERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS
(2d ed. 1988). This short discussion draws from both sources,
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who wishes to acquire a specific water right must be permitted to make
an offer to its owner. Likewise, an owner willing to part with that right,
in exchange for some consideration of greater value to him or her, must
have the right to sell. In this manner, water rights can move to their
highest-valued uses.
d. Enforcement: Property rights should be secure from involuntary
seizure or encroachment by others. Obviously, an unenforced right is in
effect no right at all. If I can simply "steal" your water right, why would
I bother paying you a significant amount of money for it?
2. There Must Be Many Buyers and Sellers
For the market to work well, no one buyer or seller, or group of buyers
or sellers, can have the power to fix the price of goods/services. If I am
the only buyer for your water supplies, you and your neighbors have no
recourse (other than not selling) from accepting whatever price I am
willing to offer for your water rights. With many buyers, if you do not
like the price that I offer, you can try other buyers. I must compete with
other buyers in order to acquire water rights. If you are the only seller
of water, then potential water rights buyers and I have no recourse from
accepting the price that you place on your water rights. With many sellers,
of course, you cannot fix prices at "high" levels because no one will buy
from you-we all buy from other sellers. The definition of "many" is
not given precisely in economics. "Many" simply means enough buyers
and sellers so that no one alone can affect prices.
3. Resources Must Be Mobile
"Mobility" in this context refers to the ease by which resources can
move from one user to all other users. Markets will not work well in
instances where it is difficult to change the site and character of the
circumstances in which the resource is used. An example of something
which has the effect of placing "barriers" to the mobility of resources is
as follows. High costs imposed on altering ownership of resources (referred to as "transaction costs") can reduce the mobility of resources.
For example, pension plans which have the effect of penalizing workers
for changing jobs can, obviously, reduce the mobility of labor resources.
The rationale for mobility being a basic requirement for a well-functioning market relates to requirement number two discussed above and
is immediately apparent after a moments reflection. If it is difficult to
move the resource from one use to another, then there would normally
be correspondingly fewer potential buyers and sellers for the good/service
in question. If it is very expensive to affect the transfer of, for example,
a water right, then only those uses which can generate the income and/
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or benefits necessary to justify high transaction costs will be in the market
for the resource. We may well be reduced to "few," as opposed to
4many," buyers and sellers.
4. Good Information Systems Are Required
The availability of information is most important for a well-functioning
market. For example, the fact that there are many potential sellers of
water rights is immaterial to me if I am unaware of their existence, and/
or if it is inordinatelycostlyfor me to learn of their existence. Similarly,
and obviously, it is of little consequence to a farmer holding water rights
that there are many potential buyers of such rights if he or she is unaware
of their existence. Buyers and sellers must have easy, and relatively
costless, access to information about "many" existing buyers and sellers
for the market to work well.
To what extent are the four conditions described above satisfied in
western water markets? At simply an intuitive level, we can respond to
this question by examining each of the requirements in turn.
Requirement number one stipulates that property rights for the goods
to be exchanged must be well-defined. What is observed to exist in many
western states, however, is an incomplete definition and assignment of
ownership (property) rights to use of water. This is particularly true for
groundwater. In New Mexico, for example, early descriptions of aquifers
by the courts reflected the view that the state owned the water in the
ground. 9 In the 1982 Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas case, 2' however, the Supreme Court rejected the view that the public trust doctrine
created a proprietary interest for the state in its water supplies, concluding
that the notion of state ownership was merely a "legal fiction." The
Sporhase decision held that simply leaving water in the ground does not
make the state the owner of its resources in any proprietary sense, and
that storage alone does not generally constitute a use of water because
there is no actual application to beneficial use. In addition, a second 1982
Supreme Court decision, Colorado v. New Mexico,2' injected more uncertainty into state water allocation decisions. In that decision, the Court
suggested that water fights long-established under prior appropriation
might not be totally protected from claims for new, more efficient uses
in another state (subject to the provision that benefits attributable to the
new uses would more than offset the losses, or costs, to the state losing
the water). This denial of state ownership of water as expressed in Spor19. See WRR, supra note 3, at 92.
20. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
21, 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
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hase and Colorado v. New Mexico, along with the long-standing recognition of proprietary federal reserve rights as decided in Winters v. United
States,2 2 have introduced considerable uncertainty into the water rights
market and the water allocation process.
The property rights questions associated with one dimension of federal
reserve rights-Indian water rights-are of particular concern to many.
Disputes over Indian water rights currently affect the availability of water
for urban use in Tucson, Phoenix, Albuquerque, and Salt Lake City; for
energy development in the San Juan, Powder River, and Uintah basins;
for the expansion of hydro-power sources for Seattle and Tucson; and for
the maintenance of non-Indian agricultural development in Arizona, Nevada, and Washington. 23 Myriad lawsuits involving water rights are pending in state and federal courts as tribes seek fulfillment of the original
government promises made to them to make their reservations "livable,
viable, self-sustaining communities., 2 4 Until the extent of the Indians'
water rights are determined by the courts, it will prove difficult to determine whether water is available for appropriation, and the sale and
transfer of existing rights will be impeded, since prospective buyers cannot be certain they are receiving secure rights.
Requirement number two stipulates that many buyers and sellers are
required for the existence of a well-functioning market. While we do not
have data which would allow even speculation as to the number of potential buyers and sellers of water rights in New Mexico's water basins,
we do know that the number of water rights transfers each year in New
Mexico is relatively small. For example, only forty-eight commercial
water rights transfers took place in the Middle Rio Grande Area (MRGA)
during the 1982-1987 period, involving rights to about 1870 acre feet of
consumptive use per annum (hereinafter, "af CU").2" The City of Albuquerque alone made 16 purchases totalling 719 af CU, or 38 percent
of all commercially transferred water rights during 1982-1987. The second
and third largest purchasers bought 491 af CU in two transfers and 311
22. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
23. K. Burke, R. Cummings, & J.Mays, supra note 7, at 16.
24. Id. at 17.
25. A recent study by P. Farah evaluates water rights trades in two urban areas and one rural area
in the northern portion of the Rio Grande basin against the idealized standards of the competitive
market, and provides the information on buyers and sellers, and on transaction costs, for the ensuing
discussions of this section. The three study areas are designated as follows: I) the Middle Rio Grande
Area, comprising the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, the Albuquerque metropolitan area.
and the Sandia Mountains; 2) the Santa Fe Area, stretching from the Pojoaque/Tesuque/Nambe
tributary system to La Cienega area, and including the City of Santa Fe and its environs; and 3) the
Galisteo Creek Area, comprising the remainder of Santa Fe County southeast of the Santa Fe Area.

See P. Farah, An Evaluation of Market Performance in New Mexico Water Rights Transfers (1988)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of N.M.).
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af CU in six transfers, respectively, while the fourth lagged far behind,
with only 58 af CU in one transfer. During the 1982-1987 period in the
MRGA, the market shares of the largest four and the largest eight buyers,
respectively, were 84 percent and 93 percent. Both of these concentration
measures are considerably higher than any commonly accepted criterion
for distinguishing between competitive and non-competitive industries.26
It is clear that this high concentration on the buyers' side of the water

market has resulted in a non-competitive situation: the City of Albuquerque exercises great influence on market price, which has hovered
around the City's standing offer of $1,000 per af CU established in 1982.
Analyses of other areas in New Mexico reveal similarly high levels of
concentration on the buyers' and sellers' sides. 7 In the Santa Fe area,
the largest four buyers during the 1976-1987 period accounted for 77
percent of the total amount of traded water rights, with the largest eight
accounting for 92 percent. In the Galisteo Creek area, the top four and
top eight concentration ratios were 86 percent and 95 percent, respectively, on the buyers' side of the market. Further, in this latter area, there
has been only one actual seller of water rights, implying a concentration
measure on the sellers' side of 100 percent! While, as noted above, there
is no objective criterion established for defining the minimum number of
buyers and sellers that would satisfy the "many" requirement, the few
transactions observed each year in New Mexico would likely not preclude
the possibility of buyers and/or sellers exerting some influence on price.
We thus suggest that the "many buyers and sellers" criterion for a wellfunctioning market is not satisfied in many areas of the State's water
markets.
Turning next to Requirement number three-resources must be "mobile"-there are two major facets of the water market in New Mexico
that may be seen as substantially limiting the mobility of water resources.
First, referring to the Rio Grande basin, it seems to be the case that the
Rio Grande Compact represents a strong institutional constraint limiting
the geographical extent of water rights markets.28 The Compact has, in
effect, prohibited water rights transfers outside the Rio Grande basin
portion which is bounded by Otowi Bridge in the north (the Upper Colo26. In fact, these concentration measures are quite close to those of several industries which
clearly exhibit a high degree of concentration: the primary aluminum (SIC Code 3341), turbines and
turbine generators (SIC Code 3511), and motor vehicles and car bodies industries (SIC Code 3711).
See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Share of Value ofShipments

Accounted for by the 4, 8, 20, and 50 Biggest Companies in Each Manufacturing Industry: 1982
and EarlierYears, in 1982 CENSUS OF MANUFACrURE: CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING
(1986).
27. P. Farah, supra note 25.
28. See Rio Grande Compact, art. I, N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-15-23 (Repl. Pamph. 1985).
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rado basin) and Elephant Butte Dam to the south (the Lower Colorado
basin). Likewise, the Compact appears to preclude water rights transfers
across "accounting points" which are further to the north, namely El
Vado Reservoir on the Rio Chama and Lobatos on the Rio Grande.29
Interstate water compacts may supersede even state law, so state water
administrators have generally been careful to ensure compliance. This
has certainly been the case in New Mexico, where the State Engineer
has clearly accorded the Rio Grande Compact the highest priority. Given
this interpretation of the Compact, potential sellers of water holding rights
in the Upper Colorado would be prohibited from selling to buyers wishing
to use the water in the Middle or Lower Rio Grande basins. That this
rule could be most effective in limiting the mobility of water resources
in the State is seen in the fact that water demands are growing most
rapidly in the Middle and, to a lesser extent, Lower Rio Grande areas,
while water supplies from the Rio Grande are relatively concentrated in
the Upper Rio Grande basin.
The second impediment to the mobility of water resources in New
Mexico results from high transaction costs. Such costs include the following: 1) costs of identifying trading partners; 2) costs associated with
the verification of ownership and the physical description of the water
right for purposes of the proposed transfer associated with the trade; 3)
administrative costs associated with the State Engineer's permitting of
the transfer and recording the change of ownership; and 4) any costs
resulting from a protest hearing or litigation associated with the proposed
transfer. Each type of cost is briefly considered below.
First, the majority of water rights trades in the state have involved the
services of an intermediary, who typically brings trading partners together
by finding water rights for a buyer or vice versa. He or she may also
assist the parties in securing the State Engineer's permission for a transfer,
and may give advice on the terms of purchase agreements. Attendant
costs may be in the form of consulting fees assessed on an hourly basis,
or they may be a percentage of the total value of the transaction. A leading
expert in water rights transfers in New Mexico reported that his charges
for a complicated transfer did not exceed a total of $2,000." When the
fees are assessed in the form of a percentage of the value of the transaction,
this percentage is comparable to what is common among real estate
brokers, namely between six and ten percent.
Second, some purchasers require verification of ownership of the water
29. Id.
30. Interview with Jim Williams, former Albuquerque District Supervisor of the State Engineer's
Office (Jan. 25, 1988). Others who have acted as intermediaries in water rights trades charge similar
fees.
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rights before they apply for a transfer. For example, the City of Albuquerque requires the prospective seller of the water right to submit a
complete abstract of the title to the land to which the right appertains and
any documents indicating that there is indeed an appurtenant water right
which has not been severed from the land or assigned to any other owners.
In some cases, the process of verification might throw serious doubt on
the correctness of an alleged owner's claims to water rights, in which
case the purchase agreement may be cancelled or modified. 3 While a
title search may cost over $1,000, typically the cost is about $300, paid
by the seller. 2
Third, most water rights trades involve a change in point of diversion
or place or purpose of use which must be permitted by the State Engineer's
Office. 3 Often an application for a water rights transfer in the Middle
Rio Grande area is preceded by a "declaration of ownership" of the water
rights in question. In the absence of an adjudication decree for the waters
of the Rio Grande, a "declaration" of water rights ownership is a means
of making public a claim to pre-1907 water rights in the MRGA.34 Such
a "declaration" requires the submission of a survey map of the land to
which the water right appertains, and such a survey can cost as much as
$1,000, depending on the size and shape of the tract(s) of land." 5
Finally, water rights trades can involve an attorney whose role may
include any combination of the following: title search, examining State
Engineer files, resolving possible disagreements and conflicts among trading partners, drawing up a purchase agreement, and "walking the application through" the State Engineer's Office. The cost of an attorney's
services may vary considerably. One lawyer, who has been involved in
over 10 water rights transfers in the Middle Rio Grande and Santa Fe
areas, estimated that the cost of hiring an attorney to assist in a fairly
simple water rights transfer was between $3,000 and $4,000. He reported
charging about $6,000 for a rather complicated transfer involving 160 af
CU.36
Legal fees can be much higher in cases which involve a protest of the
31. At the time of writing, the City of Albuquerque was negotiating its largest purchase of water
rights. The sellers had originally claimed over 1,000 af CU. After considerable research, however,
the amount of water rights proposed for transfer was quantified at about 470 af CU. Interview with
Gary Daves, City of Albuquerque water rights purchases officer (May 27, 1988) [hereinafter Interview].
32. The officer in charge of water rights purchases at the City of Albuquerque has said that he
maintains the option of having the City pay for title search as part of his negotiations with a prospective
seller. For example, one title search cost about $1,200, which the City agreed to split evenly with
the seller. Interview, supra note 31.
33. See P. Farah, supra note 25.
34. Id.
35. id.
36. Interview, supra note 31.
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State Engineer's decision on a water rights transfer, particularly if the
protest goes beyond a State Engineer's hearing and on to the courts. As
one example in this regard, promoters of the Campbell Ranch project in
New Mexico's Bernalillo County have spent well in excess of $400,000
in efforts to effect a transfer of some 900 acre feet of water, and the issue
remains in litigation after more than three years."' Equally important,
when comparing expected gains against these costs, recent examples of
efforts to transfer water rights may suggest low probabilities of success."
High transaction costs, coupled with what may appear as large uncertainties as to the success of attempts to transfer water rights, imply substantial impediments to the mobility of water resources in New Mexico's
water market.
Finally, requirement number four for a well-functioning market relates
to the availability of information. In our discussion of the property rights
requirement, we noted the impact of the lack of information regarding
ownership rights on the potential reallocation of water. Even after such
disputes are resolved, though, problems still exist which relate to the
availability of information-information as to who is offering the resource
for sale, who is a potential buyer, and information as to the quality of
the resource (in the case of water, water quality per se and, perhaps
equally important, the priority date of the water right). In certain cases,
further information may even be necessary for successful participation in
water rights trades. For example, hydrologic conditions in a given location
may be such that certain types of water rights transfers will cause third
party impairments. These, in turn, may precipitate protests and possibly
lengthy and expensive litigation. Anticipation of hydrologic and legal
outcomes may be essential, therefore, to efficient economic outcomes in
such cases.
Unfortunately, there is no established institution which acts as a clearing
house for information concerning suppliers and demanders of water rights
in the State, nor of potential protestants to a transfer. An individual with
water rights who has an interest in selling them, or an individual looking

37. Personal communication, Stan Strickman, Senior Vice President of AmeriWest Corporation,
to Professor Church (Mar. I1, 1987). In support of these data, however, see Bohannan-Huston,
Inc., Campbell Ranch Master Plan (Feb. 1987) (report prepared for the AmeriWest Corp., available
at 7500 Jefferson NE, Albuquerque, NM 87109). See also Bullock, Octillo Golf Club-A New Town,
3 ARi. GOLF J. 56-58, Nov,-Dec. 1986.
38. Two recent examples involved water rights in the La Madera area on the eastern slopes of
the Sandia Mountains. The first, a proposed purchase by a real estate developer, AmeriWest, of
about 26 af CU was blocked altogether, and the second involved the proposed transfer of water
rights to the community of La Madera for municipal purposes. This second transfer was finally
allowed in full, but only after about $40,000 in litigation costs amounting to approximately $3,650
per af CU. See P. Farah, supra note 25, at 43.

Spring 19891

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF WATER MARKETS

503

to buy water rights, can advertise in the newspaper" or, more generally,
will advise a real estate broker of his or her interest. Few brokers have
expertise in the exchange of water rights and, therefore, offer little in
terms of a conduit for information.4' Individual buyers or sellers of water
rights in the State must thus be prepared to incur substantial "search
costs" if they wish to be well informed as to options regarding such
rights.
The incentive to incur such search costs may be low, however. It is
reasonable to assume that market information is, among other things, a
function of the frequency with which buyers and sellers participate in the
market. Most likely, the higher the number of transactions in water rights
by a market participant, the better his or her knowledge of: the identity
of actual and potential sellers and buyers and their expected bids and
offers; the identity of market intermediaries and the fees which they
charge; and the procedures required by the State Engineer before a water
rights transfer is approved. In the Albuquerque area, the average number
of purchases of water rights per buyer over the period 1982-1987 has
been about 2.3 (48 transactions divided by 21 buyers). 4' With the City
of Albuquerque alone making 16 purchases, and the Valley Improvement
Association making six, 16 other purchasers made only one purchase
over the entire six year period. The probability that a party who has
actually participated in a water purchase will soon participate again in
another purchase seems to be very low. On the sellers' side, the average
number of transactions for the same period was less than 1.3 (48 transactions over 32 sellers), with the largest number of transactions per seller
being six. The majority of sellers---over 25-were involved in, again,
only one sale each over the entire period. Here again, the likelihood that
a seller would soon participate in the marketplace again seems very small.
Clearly, the rate of buyer and seller participation in the water rights market
is very low.
Our discussions above suggest that water "markets" in New Mexico
are most likely far from being "perfect," or well-functioning. Available
evidence suggests that there are not many buyers and/or sellers of water
rights in the State. 42 There are effective impediments to the mobility of
39. See, for example, the Menaut School's advertisement for the sale of 102.2 acre feet of water
at at least $1,000/a.f.y., Albuquerque Journal, Mar. 2-4, 1987. Only three bids were received for
a total of but 12 a.f.y.
40. Personal communication, supra note 37.
41. Again, information has been drawn from P. Farah, supra note 25, at 24-25.
42. Viewing this assertion in the light of the recent El Paso controversy, one should not confuse
the many applicants forfree groundwater resources in the Mesilla Bolson with many potential buyers
for rights to such water. There is no evidence that the applicants for fights to pump water from the
Mesilla Bolson are prepared to pay nontrivial amounts for such rights, with the possible exception
of El Paso.
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resources in the form of high transaction costs coupled with substantial
uncertainties surrounding successful applications for water transfers and
legal and administrative barriers to the transfer of water rights throughout
the course of rivers (the Rio Grande, in particular). Moreover, the quality
and availability of information concerning potential buyers and sellers of
water rights are quite limited. Setting aside for consideration in the following section the implications of a less-than "perfect," or well-functioning, market for water rights in the State, we conclude the discussions
of this section by inquiring as to possible actions the State might undertake
if it wished to improve the structure of its water rights market.
As is surely obvious from the above, the functioning of New Mexico's
water market would be improved by better satisfying the requirements
for a well-functioning market as given by requirements one, two, three,
and four. Given at least the possibility that failure in number two-the
lack of many buyers and sellers-may in fact be related to failures in
numbers one, three, and four (incomplete assignment of ownership rights,
high transaction costs, great uncertainty and immobile resources discouraging potential entrants to the water rights market), we focus on
numbers one, three, and four, preferring to postpone considerations related to number two.
Considering first the issue of incomplete property rights assignments,
we note that many Western state water-study groups have already recognized the importance of this issue and are recommending some form
of state appropriation as the best action available to make the most efficient
use of their water resources.43 In the case of New Mexico, for example,
state participation in some sort of water market is seen to be the best
alternative to the institutional mechanisms that currently exist. Through
such participation, the state could capture the equity interest in water
resources that it has carefully created through water regulation and investment of its taxpayers' capital."
Many other states are also currently engaged in water resources planning. For example, the Arizona legislature passed the Groundwater Management Act of 1980, a comprehensive law for statewide management
and conservation of groundwater. 5 California is also currently reviewing
and debating more integrative approaches to surface and ground water

43. See DuMars, Brown & Cummings, The States' Role in Managing and Conserving Groundwater: The Case for Establishing State Proprietary Interests in State Resources, in PROCEEDINGS:
WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, WATER MANAGEMENT SYMPOSIUM (1984) (Salt Lake City, Sept.
13-14).
44. WRR, supra note 3.

45. Arizona Groundwater Management Act, 1980 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 1, § 86 (codified as
amended at ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. Ch. 2 (1987 & Cumin. 1988).
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management.' In addition, Montana, Texas, and Colorado all have acquired proprietary interests in their water resources, and are preparing to
market water, while at the same time maintaining their authority to plan
for and manage use.4"
The advantages of state control are numerous. In arguing for state, as
opposed to federal or local, control of water resources, Hrezo and Hrezo4
contend that states possess three advantages in the formulation of distributive policies: 1) state governments are close enough to affected groups
to accommodate competing interests and develop and enforce statewide
policy goals; 2) states can provide the basin-wide perspective essential
to recognizing the water resource as a hydrologic unit; and 3) states can
integrate water policy goals and processes with other important state aims
such as economic development, land management, or coastal zone management.

Turning now to the issues concerning the mobility of water resources
in the state, it would seem that improvements in this regard would require

critical changes in water rights/management/allocation institutions in the
state. Given the requirements of the Rio Grande Compact, a change in
the compact, or in its interpretation, would be required to permit, for

example, water in the Upper Basin to be sold and transferred for uses in
the Middle and/or Lower Basins. Reducing transaction costs now required

for water rights transfers, and removing or mitigating the uncertainties
associated with applications for such transfers, would entail a restructuring
of the present hearing process which was established by legislation. How-

ever, any effort to reduce transaction costs and/or to mitigate uncertainties
would almost certainly weaken the protection of third-party rights-pri-

vate or social (as in, for example, conservation-related water-use effects)-which may be asserted as relevant to any proposed water-rights
transfer. It is therefore most difficult (at least for these authors) to imagine
the source of political support which would be required to bring about

the legislative changes required for such changes in the present hearing
processes.
Finally, in regard to requirement number four, we observe that while
there is currently no established institution which acts as a clearing house
for information, the administrative costs of instituting viable water marketing systems may not be completely prohibitive, as evidenced by the
marketing networks which have recently begun to emerge. For example,
in the Colorado Front Range city of Fort Collins, an investment orga46. WRR, supra note 3, at 253-54.
47. Id. at 246-56.
48. Hrezo & Hrezo, From Antagonistic to Cooperative Federalism on Water Resources Development, 44 AM. J. EcoN. & SOC. 191 (1985).
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nization named Western Water Rights Limited Partnership Fund I has
been formed. "Primary institutions" have put up $35 million to have the
Fund buy, sell, and manage water rights properties. 49 An awareness of
the dollar value of water is emerging even within the Wall Street investment community. On all of the principle stock exchanges, shares of
publicly-owned water companies are beginning to be recognized as attractive acquisition properties for investors.'" Further, the emerging water
market seems to be developing in inventive and interesting ways. As one
example, a new Washington-based company, International Water Resources, has been formed and plans to get the jump on brokering fresh
water. The company, which has been formed by two former oil industry
executives, plans to transfer water by using oil tankers to ship water from
areas of surplus to areas with a desperate need. 5
Although the evidence from New Mexico indicates that the involvement
of middlemen in water rights trades is modest, the state does have a
considerable number of professionals who are qualified to act as middlemen in water rights trades. A number of New Mexico attorneys advertise
their specialty in handling water rights cases, 2 and many real estate agents
also promote expertise in water rights. These professionals can play an
important role in bringing buyers and sellers together and generally profit
from their knowledge of "market" conditions.
In addition, there are a number of specialized publications dealing with
water resources in the western United States. These provide technical,
institutional, and increasingly commercial information to those who are
willing to pay. Water Market Update is a monthly bulletin published by
a water resources consulting group based in Santa Fe. The publication
specializes in issues relating to water rights trades and transfers in the
western states. It provides detailed information on "business activities
and transactions" in water rights, including prices; legal and institutional
developments; meetings, publications, and research; and other areas relating to water rights trades and transfers. Although this publication obviously does not cover all the transactions which take place in New
Mexico, it is a reliable source of information of some aspects of water
rights trading in the state, particularly prices and the identity of purchasers.

49. Rights Fund is Formed, US. WATER NEWS, Mar. 1986, at 1, col. I.
50. Water is Becoming a Dollar-and-Cents Business, U.S. WATER NEWs. Aug. 1985. at I1, col.
1.

51. Marketing Liquid Assets, U.S.

WATER NEWS, May 1986, at 6, col. I.
52. See US. WEST DIRECT, THE YELLOW PAGES, ALBUQUERQUE AND SURROUNDING AREA 866

(1987). Eight law firms advertise specialties in water law.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF AN "IMPERFECT" MARKET FOR THE
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
We have thus far argued that the major benefit from a market allocation
of resources is efficiency-"efficiency" as indicated by an allocation of
resources to, effectively, the highest number of dollar votes ("highestvalued uses"). Potential problems from such an allocative system may
arise from: the fact that income distributions are irrelevant for the allocation of resources; the effects of a distribution on future generations are
ignored; and non-market, external considerations are typically ignored.
Further, we have argued that available evidence, however anecdotal in
nature, suggests that the basic requirements for a well-functioning, "perfect" market do not exist-at least, not in the State of New Mexico.
There appear to be few, as opposed to "many," buyers and/or sellers.
There are substantial impediments to the mobility of resources in terms
of shifts in their use from one use/location to another. And, the availability
of information about buyers, sellers and qualities of water rights is, at
best, limited. Finally, we have suggested that there seem to be no compelling reasons for one to expect that these conditions could be changed
so as to better approximate those required for a perfect market.
The obvious remaining question is, So what? Given that markets for
water are not perfect, or may not function according to the economist's
ideal, how are the strengths and weaknesses of markets affected by such
"imperfections" (what might "not a well-functioning market" mean)?
An adequate response to this question is made difficult by two considerations. First, a much more technical aspect of efficiency, described
below, is involved. This aspect was not touched upon in our earlier efforts
to describe the efficiency issue as simply as possible. Second, strengths
and weaknesses, discussed separately above in section II, become inextricably related when discussing an imperfect market. In what follows,
we do our best to sort through these issues while placing a minimum
burden on the reader.
An imperfect market will still allocate resources to their highest valued
uses in the sense that dollar votes are still determinants in the ultimate
allocation. Another dimension of efficiency is missing, however. Inthe
most basic terms, in a perfectly competitive market, the ultimate price
which is determined in the market is one which just covers costs of
producing the resource in question. Thus, the (highest) value of the
resource in question just equals the value of all other resources used in
its production. Essentially, we're saying that the owner of the resource
isn't making huge, excess profits from his or her sale of the resource. In
an imperfect market, "excess" profits is the rule. If there are few sellers,
one expects prices to be held artificially high and larger profits accrue to
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the seller. If there are few buyers, prices are set artificially low (relative
to perfect market prices) and excess profits accrue to the buyers. The
bottom line is that, in a perfect market, society, as well as the direct
participants in market transactions, are made better off, distributive and
externality questions aside. With an imperfect market, buyers and/or
sellers can be expected to accrue profits at the expense of society as a
whole-the efficiency fabric of market allocations of resources is badly
torn with less than perfect competition.
As one might expect, not only are efficiency gains lost with markets
which function less than well, but at least one of the major problems
with market systems noted above-income distribution-may become
more severe. As is obvious from the above, with dollar votes directing
the allocation of resources, artificially high prices can impose still higher
costs on the poor.
V. SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR STATE AND FEDERAL
GOVERNMENTS WHICH MAY ATTEND FURTHER RELIANCE ON
MARKET ALLOCATIONS OF WATER
A move towards placing greater reliance on markets as a means for
allocating water resources in the West could pose a number of perplexing
problems for state and federal governments. In terms of state governments, the fact that water markets ignore state lines poses obvious problems for states with citizens who feel obligations to future generations.
Water planning, as it has been known in the past, would have no real
role with water markets. 53 The tax base of states becomes vulnerable, of
course, to shifts in economic 54activity from one state to another as a result
of market transfers of water.
Finally, a number of particularly thorny problems would be encountered
by the federal government if it should attempt to eliminate appurtenance
requirements" in federal water projects, thereby allowing such waters to
53. DuMars, Brown & Cummings, supra note 43. We must note that it is possible for entities
that, in some sense, acquire water rights for future generations as market participants to perform
water planning for such future generations.
54. K. Burke, R. Cummings & . Mays, supra note 7; see also WRR, supra note 3.
55. Historically, federal water projects have played acrucial role in the economic and demographic
growth of the western states. Today, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation still provides at least 20 percent
of the water in the West, most of it for agricultural purposes. However, there have been considerable
impediments to the transfer or marketing of project waters. The Reclamation Act of 1902 stated that
"the right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the
land irrigated," and that project water can be delivered only to "bona fide residents on such land."
Today, while pronouncements and actions by Bureau administrators have indicated a willingness to
accommodate transfers of project waters from agriculture to other uses within the benefited areas,
uncertainty continues to linger regarding the potential implications of the original residency and
appurtenancy requirements.
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be sold in markets. The first of these problems concerns the effects of
such actions on existing property rights. Present holders of non-federal
water rights have the current value of such rights capitalized in the value
of their land/property. The entry of federal water would result in the
virtual collapse of water rights values in many, if not most, basins-that
is, the effect of the action would be that of taking property from individuals, or certainly reducing the value of their property.
Second, the bulk of water in federal projects is used by agricultural
users. As such, the public in general, and urban users of hydroelectric
power in particular, have then subsidized the costs of making federal
water available to the agricultural users. 6 The federal government would
face the following dilemma. On one hand, serious equity considerations
may be relevant for a situation where farmers have water supplies made
available to them at highly subsidized rates and then are allowed to sell
such water and keep the proceeds-the farmers are thus the recipients of
large "rent" payments. This may be particularly troublesome when the
entity to whom the farmers will be selling the water-urban centersare the same entities who subsidized the farmer in the first place. On the
other hand, if farmers are not allowed to profit from the sale of their
federal water, they then have no incentive to sell their rights in the market,
and the efficiency gains sought by the releasing of federal water may then
be lost. We feel that this "rent distribution" issue, which has not been
addressed at any length thus far in the economics literature, could soon
become an increasingly important component of the water allocation
debate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The central issue addressed in this study is the extent to which the
market for water rights in New Mexico is a competitive, well-functioning
one. Our discussions indicate that the water "market" is probably far
from being "perfect," or well-functioning. Uncertainties regarding property rights, few market participants, potentially high transactions costs,
and inadequate information all seem to characterize the market for water
rights in the state. Further, there seem to be no compelling reasons to
expect that these conditions will soon be changed so as to better approximate those required for a competitive market. One consequence of all
this is the possibility of buyers and sellers in imperfect markets accruing
profits at the expense of society as a whole. Finally, we note that greater
reliance on markets could actually pose some perplexing equity-related
problems for state and federal governments.
56. Bumess, Cummings, Gorman & Lansford, supra note 13.

